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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court severely limited Congress's authority to enact legislation
under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez' and United States v.
Morrison.2 Scholars have made much of these decisions, questioning their validity
and long-term viability.3 Environmental law commentators have particular cause

* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 2000
Columbia College, Columbia University. I would like to thank Professor Dawn Johnsen for
her advice and comments. I would also like to thank Amy Cohen and Josh Chanin for their
assistance in editing this Note. Finally, I would especially like to thank Chelsea T. Wald for
her editorial and emotional support.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause in regulating the possession of guns near schools in the Gun-Free School
Zones Act).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the civil remedy provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act went beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause).
3. See, e.g., John A. Frerejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1034-35 (2002);
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 138-43 (2001). The Indiana University School of Law dedicated a symposium to the
issues raised in part by Morrison and Lopez, entitled CongressionalPower in the Shadow of
the Rehnquist Court: Strategiesfor the Future, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003). The topics covered by
participants included possible strategies for restricting the Court's power. See, e.g., Evan H.
Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Super Majority Rule, 78
IND. L.J. 73 (2003) (proposing a requirement of a supermajority for the Court to overturn
acts of Congress enacted under the Commerce Clause); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in
CongressionalRegulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003) (encouraging Congress to
use the appointments process to keep a check on the Court). This summary of the
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for concern. The Court's suggestion in these cases, that Congress may regulate only
"economic activity" under its commerce power, 4 has particular relevance in the
context of environmental law where little of the conduct regulated is "economic"
on its face. In fact, the Court has already intimated that Congress does not have
authority under its commerce power to protect isolated wetlands, 5 and scholars
predict that the Court may strike down the takings provision of the Endangered
Species Act. 6 In an attempt to preserve Congress's continued ability to regulate in
these areas, some have suggested an alternative source of authority-the Property
Clause.7
Under the Property Clause, Congress has the power to "dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States."' The Court has interpreted Congress's property
power very broadly, stating in the past that it is "without limitation." 9 Most
recently, however, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,10 the Court hedged on this
proclamation, stating that the "furthest reaches of the power granted by the
symposium is based on Marci A. Hamilton's brief synopsis of the above papers in
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and
InstitutionalizedPersonsAct, 78 IND. L.J 311, 312 n.2. Hamilton ultimately disagrees with
those seeking to limit the Court's power, concluding that "the Court's federalism
jurisprudence is performing a direly needed public service for the people." Id. at 320.
4. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
5. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74
(2001) (The Court did not make this determination on constitutional grounds, but it limited
the Clean Water Act's scope to exclude isolated wetlands, noting that a broader
interpretation "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use," raising "significant constitutional questions."); see
also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the MigratoryBird Rule, 31 ENvTL. L. REP.
11,079, 11,082 (2001) ("There seems to be little, if any, doubt that if Congress ever were to
pass a law employing similar means or seeking to [protect isolated wetlands] that the Court
would strike it down as violating the Commerce Clause.").
6. Peter A. Appel, The Powerof Congress "Without Limitation": The Property Clause
and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2001); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez World: Some Questions and
Answers, 30 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,980 (2000); Sophie Akins, Note, Congress' Property Clause
Power to Prohibit Taking EndangeredSpecies, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167 (2000); Gavin
R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and CongressionalAuthorityfor
the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1125, 1125-26
(1998). For the view that Congress's power to enact environmental legislation is not affected
by Lopez or Morrison, see Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but
Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 81-82
(1996) (making the argument after Lopez); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate
Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State
Authority and Exceed the OuterLimits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723, 79395 (2002); Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress and the Court's New
FederalismDoctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413 (2003).
7. Appel, supra note 6, at 6; Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 10,990; Akins, supra note 6, at
168-69; Villareal, supra note 6, at 1147-53.
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
9. Appel, supra note 6, at 2 (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S 16, 29
(1940)).
10. 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act).
For additional discussion about Kleppe, see infra note 20 and text accompanying notes 10610.
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Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved,"" leaving open the
"question of the permissible reach ... over private lands."' 12 The question of how
much power the Property Clause gives Congress to regulate activities on nonfederal lands is of key importance to anyone hoping to use the Property Clause to
enact environmental legislation. While the federal government owns more than
one-cuarter of the land in the United States' 3 and has extensive power over that
land, 4 those hoping to use the Property Clause as alternative authority for widereaching regulations like the Endangered Species Act' 5 need the clause to apply
extraterritorially, or beyond the boundaries of federal lands.
The Supreme Court has upheld extraterritorial applications of the Property
Clause, but only in cases dealing with physical threats to federal property coming
from immediately adjacent lands. 16 Would the Court uphold an act promulgated
under the Property Clause that involves regulation of activity that takes place far
afield, like the Endangered Species Act, which under the Commerce Clause
prohibits the taking of protected animals anywhere? 7 As Peter A. Appel puts the
overarching question of this Note, "What are the 'furthest reaches'
of the power
,8
that the Court has otherwise described as 'without limitation'?"
Among scholars advocating the Property Clause as an alternative source of
power for Congress's environmental regulations, only Appel has attempted to
answer this question.' 9 Appel envisions an expansive property power analogous to

11. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
12. Id. at 547.
13. 27.7% to be exact. PUBLIC

LAND STATISTICS

2000, at 7 tbl.l-3 (2000), reprinted in

GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 10

(5th ed.

2002).
14. Appel provides an in-depth history of the broad power held by the government on
its lands in the post-Dred Scott era. Appel supra note 6, at 55-78 (citing, e.g., Kleppe v. New
Mexico 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S 16, 29 (1940);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); Gibson v.
Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1872)).
15. See Appel, supra note 6, at 6; Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 10,990; Akins, supra note
6, at 168-69; Villareal, supra note 6, at 1147-53.
16. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (upholding a federal statute imposing
criminal punishment for failure to extinguish a fire built near federal lands); Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (upholding a statute prohibiting the enclosure of public
lands, even when the enclosing fences are built on surrounding private lands). Lower courts
have also dealt with statutes having extraterritorial effects, most notably in Minnesota v.
Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding provisions of the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness Act, which regulated the use of motorboats and snowmobiles on adjacent
non-federal lands and waters). See also United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Ci. 1982)
(upholding compliance inspection of a mining claim by government agents on land adjacent
to federal property); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding limits
on duck hunting occurring in close proximity to federal lands); Appel, supra note 6 at 77-78.
No court, however, has dealt with regulations of activity well distant from public lands.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000).
18. Appel, supra note 6, at 2. Appel is referring, of course, to limits other than those
that apply to all legislation, such as the Due Process Clause. See id. at 79.
19. Eugene R. Gaetke and Joseph L. Sax proposed tests in the pre-Lopez era for finding
the limits of the Property Clause. Gaetke developed a balancing test that weighed the value
of an extraterritorial regulation to the public lands against the imposition that regulation

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:515

the "plenary congressional authority" once held under the commerce power, but
free of the limits of Lopez and Morrison.20 To this end, he proposes a test that
allows Congress to regulate extraterritorial activities under the Property Clause as
long as it can "demonstrate a nexus between the rule or regulation and the federal
property being protected.'
This Note contends, however, that if an easy-to-satisfy test, such as the
"nexus" test, defines the outer limits of the property power, that power will come to
present the same concerns the Court expressly considered in Morrison and Lopez:
an unchecked federal police power; 22 the aggrefation of effects that, on their face,
have nothing to do with the clause at hand; 3 and interference by the federal

would put on the owners of affected property, Eugene R. Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion
Under the Property Clause, 33 HASTINGs L.J. 381, 398 (1981), while Sax relied on language
from Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), the earliest property case investigating
a regulation of non-federal property, in a proposal that the government only be able to
regulate nuisance-like activities. Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The NationalParks and the
Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 239, 250-55 (1976). Appel is convincing in
his assertion that Gaetke's proposed "rough calculus" gives an inappropriate amount of
policy-making power to the judiciary, Appel, supra note 6, at 87-89. Appel also draws
attention to the flaws of Sax's proposal, indicating that it "incorporates the inherent
weaknesses of substantive nuisance law and fails to define the outer boundary of
congressional authority under the Property Clause." Id. at 88. See infra text accompanying
notes 100-05 for a discussion of a test proposed by Blake Shepard, The Scope of Congress'
Constitutional Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to
Furtherthe Purposes of National Parks and WildernessAreas, 11 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv.
479 (1984).

20. Appel, supra note 6, at 96, 98, 101-02. Appel additionally concludes that the
federalism limits of the Tenth Amendment should not apply to the property power. Id. at
103-17. This Note does not question that judgment in large part because the modem Court's
first case limiting congressional commerce power due to federalism concerns, National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), was decided within a week of Kleppe

v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), see supra text accompanying notes 10-12, where the
Court unanimously "ignored New Mexico's effort to base a claim on the tenth amendment."
Sax, supra note 19, at 253 n.72 (citing Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 25).
Kleppe, although unanimous, has been found to have had doubters. In a recently discovered
note to Justice Marshall, Justice Burger expressed concern about the case, writing, "I
assumed ranchers would want to be free to shoot trespassing burros but if Byron [White] and
Bill Rehnquist want to put wild burros on a new form of 'welfare' I will submit." COGGINS
E r AL., supra note 13, at 193 (quoting J. Burger).
21. Appel, supra note 6, at 83.
22. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000) ("'[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 564)).
23. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("If accepted, petitioners'
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.").
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government in areas of traditional state concern.24 Therefore, if the Court continues
to make decisions based on these concerns, it probably will not adapt Appel's
"nexus" test to assess legislation Congress enacts under the Property Clause. In
reaching this conclusion, Part II of this Note analyzes Appel's "nexus" test and
presents a number of hypothetical acts he finds valid under it. Part mI utilizes these
acts to show how legislation enacted under a broadly construed property power
would likely present the same concerns that prompted the decisions in Morrison
and Lopez. Part IV proposes a "direct physical harm" test as an alternative for
finding the limits of the Property Clause and examines the ramifications of
adopting it. Part V concludes that, in light of Lopez and Morrison, the "direct
physical harm" test provides a better guide than the "nexus" test in predicting how
the Court will review wide-reaching environmental regulations enacted under the
Property Clause.
I. THE "NEXUS" TEST AND HYPOTHETICAL ACTS
Appel bases his proposed limits on the property power on the text of the
Constitution and through analogy to the Commerce Clause.25 Appel creates his test
for determining the limits on the property power without the benefit of decisive
Supreme Court interpretation, as Kleppe v. New Mexico did not resolve the
"question of the permissible reach" of Congress when legislating under its property
power "over private lands."2 6
Article IV of the Constitution states that Congress may "dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. ' 27 Appel identifies the terms "needful" and
"respecting" as two key elements of this clause. 28 Since the Court will defer to
Congress in determinations of what is "needful" federal action, he correctly
observes that the meaning of "respecting" is the only element left open to
interpretation. 9
The requirement of "respecting" federal property will easily be met when
Congress is legislating activities on its own land, any of which will "respect" that
land. When Congress attempts to legislate extraterritorially, on the other hand, the
meaning of "respecting" becomes very important. Appel states that the requirement
merely imposes a limitation that demands Congress "demonstrate a nexus between
the rule or regulation and the federal property being protected., 30 Just how
expansive the authority Appel believes Congress possesses under this "limitation"

24. Id. at 611 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ("'Were the
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern..
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur ....
25. Appel, supra note 6, at 79-80, 94-96.
26. 426 U.S. 529, 547 (1976). Kleppe dealt with regulations affecting federal property.
It held that Congress could prohibit takings of burros on public lands contrary to New
Mexico state law legitimating the practice. The Court found Congress's determination that
horses and burros constituted "an integral part of the natural system of the public lands,"
meant that regulations of their taking constituted "'needful' regulation 'respecting' the
public lands." Id. at 535-36.
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
28. Appel, supra note 6, at 80.
29. Id. at 82 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
30. Id. at 83.
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can be seen in the ways he demonstrates this "nexus." First, Congress can
demonstrate a "nexus" by aggregating effects, which allows regulation of
"activities that, in the aggregate, harm federal lands in a demonstrable way." 31
Second, Congress can demonstrate the "nexus" based solely on "the tangible
presence of federal property" near the activity being regulated. 3
Appel believes that the near-plenary extraterritorial authority thus provided
Congress under the Property Clause is analogous to the power created in the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence and therefore represents a valid proposal
for limits on the property power.33 This Note examines a number of hypothetical
acts Appel finds valid under his proposed test to illustrate how extensive a broadly
interpreted property power can be.
Appel uses the first two of these hypothetical acts specifically to show the
broad power Congress would enjoy under his vision of the Property Clause. The
final three acts represent legislation that either replaces current commerce power
regulations in danger of being struck down by the courts or that Congress has
already considered.
A. The "NationalParks CleanAir Act"34
Appel proposes the "National Parks Clean Air Act" to be a "broad statute
regulating the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and oxides of Nitrogen (NOx)"
enacted "because these emissions are precursors to acid rain, which harms national
parks. 35 Appel imagines this statute as reaching polluters "both within and outside
of the state in which federal lands lie." 36 This statue is easily found valid under
Appel's broad vision of the Property Clause, as he finds that there is clearly a
"nexus between the rule or regulation and the federal property being protected"
because the emissions, taken together, create acid rain that will damage federal
lands, 37or in other words, "in the aggregate, harm federal lands in a demonstrable
way.",

B. The "Gun-Free FederalBuilding Zones Act"
Appel's hypothetical "Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act" simply mirrors
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,38 which the Court struck down in United

31. Id. at 84.
32. Id. at 125.
33. Id. at 94-96.
34. The hypothetical acts in this Note will always appear in quotation marks, to
distinguish them from official acts of Congress.
35. Appel, supra note 6, at 80. To avoid proposing a statute that would have been valid
under Sax's nuisance theory of the property clause, see supra note 19, Appel asserts that the
level of this regulation "would exceed the level produced through a nuisance-abatement
action." Id. at 81.
36. Id. at 80. It was presumably the thought of statutes like this that prompted Eugene
R. Gaetke to worry that a Property Clause "without limitations" could lead, hypothetically,
to "a state containing no federal lands [to] be subjected to ... federal regulation." Gaetke,
supra note 19, at 394 n.73.
37. Appel, supra note 6, at 83-84.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000).
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States v. Lopez. 39 The Gun-Free Schools Zones Act made it a federal offense to
carry a firearm in a school zone. Appel's version merely switches the source of
congressional power from the Commerce Clause to the Property Clause, and
changes the School Zones Act to "within 1000 feet of a federal building." 4 Appel
finds the nexus between carrying firearms and federal property to exist because
firearms located near a federal building "can cause death and serious injury, limit
worker productivity, and
create increased security costs for the federal government
41
to protect its property.",
C. The "Clean Water Act"
Appel's version of the "Clean Water Act" utilizes the Property Clause instead
of the Commerce Clause as the source of congressional authority. The Act is
otherwise unchanged, 42 except that under Appel's version it could reach isolated
wetlands that the Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause version not to
reach in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.43 Appel

believes that reaching these wetlands is valid under his "nexus" test if Congress "in
clear legislation indicate[s] that migratory birds constitute an essential attribute of
the beauty and value of public lands; that migratory birds rely on isolated wetlands
for their habitat and breeding; and that filling such wetlands would damage the
property of the United States.""
D. The "EndangeredSpecies Act"
Appel is not alone in his notion that the Property Clause could provide an
alternative source of authority for congressional regulation of takings of
endangered species, 45 and this Note will examine both his version of an
"Endangered Species Act" and one proposed by Sophie Akins. Appel confines his
version of the Act to "those species [that] sometimes occupy federal lands," and the
protection of which Congress determines "preserves the overall value of the federal
lands." 46 The limitation requiring that the species touch the land, however, seems to

39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40. Appel, supra note 6, at 80. Appel points out that carrying firearms into federal

buildings is already prohibited. Id. at 80 n.372 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 930 (2000)).
41. Id. at 98.
42. It would prohibit the discharge of pollutants into waters, just like the original, 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003).
43. 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001) (The Court did not make this determination on
constitutional grounds but did suggest that the broader interpretation would raise "significant
constitutional questions.").
44. Appel, supra note 6, at 123. Appel admits that because of the requirement of a
"nexus" built on migratory birds his version of the Act may not reach all the wetlands
reached by the Commerce Clause version. Id. Thus, Appel presumably means that he
envisions the Property Clause version as a supplement to the original.
45. See Akins, supra note 6; Villareal supra note 6. The need for alternative authority
for the takings clause of the current Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)
(2000), may never arise since the Supreme Court recently declined to hear a Morrison-like
challenge to the Act. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom.
Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). See also Mank, supra note 6, at 793-95.
46. Appel, supra note 6, at 122.
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unnecessarily limit Congress's power under Appel's "nexus" test. If all that is
required is that the regulated activity "in the aggregate, harm[s] federal lands in a
demonstrable way, ''47 Sophie Akins's argument that Congress can regulate any
endangered species, "because the extinction of one species could logically have an
effect on other species located on federal land, 45 would meet Appel's property
power standard just as easily.
E. The "NationalParks PeripheryAct"
Appel does not name the next hypothetical act, but this Note will address it as
the "National Parks Periphery Act" because Appel envisions it as a "statute that
dictates land-use planning within a certain radius around a national park," where
the "Park Service directly regulates everything from the presence of fast food
restaurants and trinket shops to the color and style of the buildings in order to
protect the visual corridor leading to [that] ...park." 49 This Act is different from
those above because "some evidence exists that Congress has attempted to extend
the reach of its Property Clause power to this extent."5 ° Suggesting that this Act
provides a closer call than his other hypothetical regulations, 1 Appel nonetheless
concludes that, "the tangible presence of federal property. . ,provides a sufficient
nexus between the federal concern and the activity regulated.
The breadth and variety of these extraterritorial regulations exhibits an
extremely broad property power that could significantly supplement and, if
necessary, replace the power Congress has under the Commerce Clause to create
environmental and other regulations.
H1.

APPLYING LOPEZ AND MORRISON TO

THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

In Lopez and Morrison, the Court considered a variety of factors in coming to
a decision to limit the scope of the commerce power: the possible development of
an unchecked federal police power,53 Congress's aggregation of noneconomic

47. Id. at 84.
48. Akins, supra note 6, at 185. Akins does not suggest any limit on Congress's power
under the Property Clause except to mention that Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976), left "open the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands."
Akins, supra note 6, at 184-85.
49. Appel, supra note 6, at 124.
50. Id. Appel references the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16
U.S.C. § 554 (2000), enacted under the Commerce Clause (in the pre-Lopez era), which a
Ninth Circuit Court in Columbia River Gorge United-Protecting People and Prop. v. Yeutter,
960 F.2d 110, 113-14 (9th Cir. 1992), noted might have legitimately been enacted under
Property Clause authority. Appel, supra note 6, at 124 n.55 1.
51. Appel, supra note 6, at 124.
52. Id. at 125.
53. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments,
we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.") (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
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effects,54 and interference by the federal government in areas of traditional state
concern.5 5 The limitations imposed by these areas of concern are what those hoping
to provide authority for environmental regulations under the Property Clause wish
to avoid.56 The question remains, however: will similar concerns arise under an
expansive property power, inciting the Court to limit congressional power under
the Property Clause?
In an attempt to address that question, this Note will examine each area of
concern to determine whether any of the hypothetical extraterritorial acts above,
legitimate under Appel's broad vision of the property power, would create
problems in that area. Finally, the acts that present a majority of the Morrison and
Lopez concerns will be identified as creating the most tension with the Court's
jurisprudence in those cases.
A. PolicePower
The Court in Morrison and Lopez stressed that the "[federal] government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers." 57 One of the arenas of
58
regulation that the Constitution reserves for the states is a plenary police power.
Interference with this power was a principal concern of the Court in Morrison and
Lopez. As the Court put it when discussing the Gun-Free School Zones Act,59 'To
uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States." 6
The hypothetical "National Parks Periphery Act"6 1 illustrates how an act,
legitimate under a broad view of the Property Clause, can present precisely the
police power concerns that motivated the Court in Lopez and Morrison. According
to Appel, this Act is a legitimate use of Congress's property power because the
extraterritorial activities forms a
"tangible presence of federal property" near
"nexus" between the rule and those activities. 62
While the "National Parks Periphery Act" specifically regulates land-use, if
Congress, under a broad view of the property power, can legislate wherever there is
the "tangible presence of federal property," it could regulate any activity that takes

54. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. ("If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.").
55. Id. at 611 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ("Were the
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern..
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur . .
56. See, e.g., Akins, supra note 6, at 185.
57. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)) (alteration in original); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 ("Every law enacted by Congress
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.").
58. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 ("The Constitution... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary
police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.") (citing U.S.
CoN sT. art. I, § 8).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000).
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
62. Appel, supra note 6, at 125.
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place "within a certain radius" 63 of public lands. For example, as Ronald F. Frank
and John H. Eckhard fear in their contemplation of a broad property power, "it
could be argued that Congress could control the volume on transistor radios played
within the hearing of an animal in a federal wildlife Xreserve, even if the owner of
the radio was on his own property fifty miles away." The requirement of "tangible
presence of federal property" simply puts no limits on the types of activities that
Congress could regulate, nor on how large a "radius" around federal lands it could
control.
Thus, under the "nexus" test, in any state with a great deal of federal land, 65 it
is conceivable that a broadly construed Property Clause could give Congress the
specificall, proscribed plenary police power, allowing it to regulate any activity in
that state. The "National Parks Periphery Act" presents the same problem of an
unchecked federal police power that the Court addressed in Morrison and Lopez.
B. Aggregation of Effects
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down certain
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. 67 Despite Congress's
"numerous findings" that gender-motivated violence in the aggregate affects
interstate commerce, 68 the Court rejected the government's argument that
"Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. ' ' 69 The Court feared such
reasoning because "[iff accepted [it] would allow Congress to regulate any crime as
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that70 crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption.
The Court will probably fear extraterritorial applications of an expansive
property power for similar reasons. Just as aggregation of noneconomic activity has
no effect on interstate commerce "visible to the naked eye," 7 1 aggregation of
extraterritorial activities frequently has no effect on public lands that is "visible to
the naked eye." Or, as Eugene R. Gaetke writes, at some point in regulating
extraterritorial activity, "[t]he connection between the conduct regulated on
nonfederal property . . . may become so tenuous that it requires a judicial

63. Id. at 124.
64. Ronald F. Frank & John H. Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the PropertyClause
to Give ExtraterritorialEffect to Federal Lands Law: Will "Respecting Property" Go the
Way of "Affecting Commerce"?, 15 NAT. REsOURCES LAW. 663,664 (1983).
65. Nevada, 82.9%; Alaska, 62.4%; Utah, 64.5%; Idaho, 62.5%. PUBLIc LAND
STATIsTICs 2000,

reprintedin CoGGiNs ET AL., supra note 13, at 10.

66. Appel believes the greater concern is that the prohibition of "the exercise of federal
police power to protect its lands within a state 'would place the public domain of the United
States completely at the mercy of state legislation."' Appel, supra note 6, at 101 (quoting
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)). While this is a valid concern it does
not preclude a property power narrower than the one Appel envisions.
67. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy provisions found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981(c) (2000)).
68. Id. at 614.
69. Id. at 617.
70. Id. at 615.
71. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
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conclusion that the legislation is . . . no[t] 'respecting the federal lands.' 72 Thus,
aggregating the effects of extraterritorial activities to demonstrate an effect on
federal lands can be seen as analogous to aggregating the effects of noneconomic
activity to demonstrate an effect on interstate commerce. In both cases, an
interpretive leap is required to connect the activities in question to the clause of the
Constitution empowering Congress to regulate that activity. The Court in Morrison
held that such an73 interpretation would grant Congress a power without any
meaningful limits.

A number of the hypothetical acts discussed earlier present examples of how
aggregation of effects in extraterritorial applications of a broad property power
potentially could lead to the kind of limitless congressional power the Court feared
in Lopez and Morrison. None of these acts regulate activities with effects on public
lands that are "visible to the naked eye."
First, the "National Parks Clean Air Act ' 74 requires aggregation of effects to
meet the requirement of "respecting" federal property. An isolated emission of
NOx or SO2 will not lead to acid rain in levels necessary to noticeably touch federal
lands, but the aggregated effects of a system of emissions will. Similarly, the "GunFree Federal Buildings Zones Act" 75 can regulate extraterritorial activity because of
the aggregation of perceived effects caused by the presence of guns near federal
buildings. In order for this Act to "respect" federal property, one must make the
cognitive leap between threats to federal employees and impact on federal property.
The hypothetical "Clean Water Act" 76 does not require the aggregation of
effects to reach activity "respecting" federal property. Filling a wetland has a direct
negative effect on migratory birds that Congress considers essential attributes of
federal property.77 Finally, while Appel's version of the "Endangered Species
Act" 78 similarly does not require aggregation of effects as it limits takings of
animals directly related to the federal property, 79 Akins's does. As shown in Part II,
Akins's version is equally valid under a broad vision of the Property Clause.8" Her
version of the Act requires aggregation of the effects of takings of entirely
extraterritorial endangered species in order to make the connection to animals
8
(presumably through food chains and habitat overlap) that touch federal property. 1
Thus, a broad property power could, to mirror the language of the Court, allow
Congress to regulate any extraterritorial activity as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that activity has substantialeffects on federal employees on
public lands, the budget for public lands, or extraterritorial endangered species.82

The Court in Morrison was wary of aggregating effects of noneconomic activity

72. Gaetke, supra note 19, at 395 (emphasis added).
73. See supra text accompanying note 66.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
77. See supra text accompanying note 44.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
79. Related because of the presence of the species on the public lands. Appel, supra
note 6, at 122.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
81. Akins, supra note 6, at 185.
82. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("[P]etitioners' reasoning

would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of
that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.").
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that, through the intermediaries of impact on employment, production, transit, and
consumption, had an effect on interstate commerce. Similarly, the Court will likely
look askance at regulation requiring the aggregation of extraterritorial activities
that, through intermediary steps, have an effect on public lands.
Potential extraterritorial applications of a broadly construed property power,
like the "National Parks Clean Air Act," the "Gun-Free Federal Building Zones
Act," and the "Endangered Species Act," therefore can be seen as promoting
similar concerns of aggregating effects that arose in the context of the commerce
power. In order to address those concerns, the Court will, in all probability, look for
some guide in determining when Congress may aggregate effects when legislating
under the property power, just as it did in Morrison and Lopez by creating the
economic/noneconomic distinction.
C. Areas of TraditionalState Concern
In United States v. Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, providing the votes
necessary to strike down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, were concerned that the
Act "intrude[d] upon... area[s] of traditional state concern." 8 3 As Justice Kennedy
wrote, "[w]ere the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of
traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of
commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal 4 and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory."
The majority opinion in Lopez also expressed concern that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, 85 which made it a federal offense to carry a firearm in a
school zone, treaded on "areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign."8 6 In examining the Civil Rights
Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,87 the Court in Morrison was
concerned not only about federal interference with the regulation of crime88 but
also family law and by extension a number of other "areas of traditional state
regulation.,89
The Court revisited the Commerce Clause and "areas of traditional state
concern" issue more recently in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers.9° While the Court did not make a constitutional ruling on the Clean
Water Act, 9' it did limit the Act's scope to exclude isolated wetlands, noting that a

83. 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 577, quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. Kennedy in concurrence focused primarily on education
stating that "An interference ... occurs here, for it is well established that education is a
traditional concern of the States." Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000).
88. "[Tlhe suppression of which has always been the prime object of the States' police
power." Morrison,529 U.S. at 615.
89. Id. at 615-16 (listing "marriage, divorce, and childrearing" as "areas of traditional
state regulation").
90. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2002).
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impingement of the State's
broader interpretation "would result in a significant 92
traditional and primary power over land and water use."
In considering extraterritorial applications of the property power, Gaetke
recognized that "the property clause regulation of conduct on nonfederal property
encroaches upon the state's
traditional regulatory role," and therefore is a matter of
"significant concern." 93 Many of the extraterritorial hypothetical acts, valid under
Appel's broadly reaching property power and discussed in Part II of this Note,
conflict with areas of traditional state concern.
The "Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act" intrudes upon state criminal law
enforcement in the same manner as the Court found the Gun-Free Schools Zones
Act to do.94 Two of Appel's other hypothetical regulations with extraterritorial
reach, the "National Park Periphery Act" and the "Clean Water Act," also raise
problems of intrusion into areas of state concern. First, the concern in Solid Waste
Agency, that regulation of isolated wetlands "would result in a significant
impingement of the State's traditional and primary power over land and water
use," 9 applies just as much under the Property Clause as the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, as Appel admits, the "National Parks Periphery Act" "regulates wholly
intrastate conduct that falls within the ambit of activities traditionally regulated by
states and local governments." 96 Thus, a number of Appel's hypothetical acts raise
issues of intrusion into areas of state or local concern.
Legislation enacted under a broadly reaching property power like that
hypothesized by Appel, and limited only by the "nexus" test, can present problems
in all three of the areas of concern addressed in Morrison and Lopez: an unchecked
federal police power; 97 the aggregation of effects that, on their face, have nothing
to do with the clause at hand; a and interference by the federal government in areas

92. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174.

93. Gaetke, supra note 19, at 394. Appel, on the other hand, while recognizing that the
Court's concern with areas of traditional state regulation in the cases mentioned above could
impose a limit on the extraterritorial power Congress wields under the Property Clause
discounts any effect such a concern might have on his hypothetical extraterritorial
regulations. Appel, supra note 6, at 101-02.
94. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (stating that the government's
position would lead to intrusion into "areas such as criminal law enforcement or education

where States historically have been sovereign"). Appel argues that since firearm possession
is "a subject of federal regulation from early times," the "Gun-Free Federal Building Zones
Act" poses no threat to areas of traditional state concern. Appel, supra note 6, at 102. That
argument, however, fails to address the Court's concern in Lopez that the criminal aspect of
the Act intruded upon areas of state concern.
95. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174.
96. Appel, supra note 6, at 125. Appel, however, does not return to the question of
whether this intrusion might cause problems under Morrison and Lopez.
97. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)
("'[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564)).
98. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. ("If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.").
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of traditional state concern. 99 Regulations that will likely cause the greatest concern
for the Court are those that present a majority of the above problems. The "GunFree Federal Building Zones Act," Akins's version of the "Endangered Species
Act," and the "National Parks Periphery Act," all raise two of the three Morrison
and Lopez concerns. Appel's version of the "Endangered Species Act," the "Clean
Water Act," and the "National Parks Clean Air Act," each present only one of the
Morrison and Lopez concerns. Appel's broad vision of the property power, with its
limits defined by the "nexus" test, makes no distinction between the extraterritorial
regulations above, permitting them all. However, a court wishing to address the
concerns laid out in Morrison and Lopez will presumably adopt a more rigorous
test.
Ill. THE "DIRECT PHYSICAL HARM" TEST

Relying heavily on Blake Shepard, this Note proposes a test that courts
wishing to consider the concerns of Morrison and Lopez might accept for
determining if extraterritorial applications of the property power are valid. Shepard
imagines a two-prong test for limiting the property power that permits Congress, in
its first part, "to regulate activity on non-federal property in order to protect federal
lands from physical harm."'l If the first prong is not met, Shepard allows, in the
second half of his test, for Congress to declare a "purpose" for federal lands.' 1
Once Congress makes such a declaration, it can regulate activities (on or off federal
lands) that interfere0 2 with a "use of [the] federal property" that is in line with its
federal "purpose."'
Even as the first half of Shepard's test imposes a useful limit, the second
undermines it. If permitting Congress to make unlimited determinations on what
affects interstate commerce transforms the Commerce Clause into the "[h]ey, youcan-do whatever-you-feel-like Clause,"' 0 3 allowing legislators to determine the
"purpose" of federal lands and then regulate for that "purpose" similarly establishes
a broad Property Clause. 1°4 Under this test, Congress would enjoy broad
interpretive powers only differentiated from its pre-Lopez commerce power in that

99. Id. at 611 ("'Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern... the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur ...' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
100. Shepard, supra note 19, at 535. Appel addresses Shepard's Property Clause theory,
but confines his criticism to the portion of the theory that addresses regulations of activity on

federal lands, providing little insight to Shepard's extraterritorial considerations. Appel,
supra note 6, at 94-96 n.427.
101. Shepard, supra note 19, at 535.
102. Id.
103. Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5
(1995). While this Note sees Kozinski's phrase as applying equally to broad commerce and
property powers, Akins cites Kozinski only to emphasize Congress's pre-Lopez power under
the Commerce Clause but does not mention his words in regards to her broad interpretation
of the property power. See Akins, supra note 6, at 167 n.6.
104. The Eighth Circuit promoted the same argument in upholding the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, which regulated the use of motorboats and
snowmobiles on adjacent non-federal lands and waters, in the pre-Lopez era, but the
Supreme Court never heard the question. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
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it would be determining the "purpose" of federal lands instead of what affects
"interstate commerce."
For this reason, a court might dismiss the second half of the Shepard test and
look at the first half alone. Thus, the outer limits of the property power will allow
Congress to "regulate activity on non-federal property in order to protect federal
lands from physical harm."' 0 5 Without slight alteration, however, this formulation
also gives Congress incredibly broad interpretive power, allowing it to make
determinations of what "harms" federal lands. Just as the Court limited the power
of Congress to make determinations of what affects interstate commerce with an
"economic/noneconomic" inquiry, this Note suggests that the Court might respond
favorably to a test that looks to directness, permitting Congress to regulate
extraterritorial activity only to protect federal lands from direct physical harm.
Although Kleppe v. New Mexico did not define the limits of Congress's
extraterritorial property power, 1 6 the decision proves useful in analyzing how the
"direct physical harm" test might function. In Kleppe, the Court upheld the Wild
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act in the face of a challenge that the regulation
exceeded Congress's power under the Property Clause.' 0 7 In making the decision,
the Court briefly mentioned a number of congressional findings that went into the
Act. 0 8 One of these findings deemed horses and burros '"an integral part of the
natural system of the public lands' of the United States.'' 09 In other words,
Congress had determined that the animals in question were part of the federal
lands. This determination suggests an interesting refinement of the "protect from
direct physical harm" test. Namely, that Congress can decide, through legislation,
what constitutes the federal property that it can "protect from direct physical harm"
when regulating extraterritorially. Congress's interpretive discretion in such a
decision can be limited by requirement that anything determined to be part of the
federal lands must form "an integral part of the natural system" of those lands." 0
Granting this congressional determination gives Congress a broader power than the
"protect from direct physical harm" test suggests on its face, while still imposing
meaningful limits on interpretation not present in more speculative determinations
of the public lands' "purpose" or what constitutes "harm" to it.1
Having examined the "direct physical harm" test under Kleppe, it is now
important to determine whether it addresses the concerns of Morrison and Lopez.
The test can be justified in a similar way to the limitations imposed in Morrison
and Lopez. In those cases, the Court determined that every regulation it had
'' 2
authorized under the Commerce Clause had dealt with "economic activity.

105. Shepard, supra note 19, at 535.
106. 426 U.S. 529, 530 (1976) ("The question of the Act's permissible reach under the

Property Clause over private lands to protect wild free-roaming horses and burros that have
strayed from public land need not be, and is not, decided in the context of this case.").
107. Id. at 529.
108. Id. at 535-36. The Court did not see the need to examine them very deeply because
"determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of
Congress." Id. at 536.
109. Id. at 535 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1970)).
110. Id.

111. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (citing United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995)).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:515

Similarly, every instance the Supreme Court has found the property power
' 3 to apply
extraterritorially has involved the threat of some "direct physical harm." 1
An analysis under the "direct physical harm" test of the hypothetical acts
discussed within this Note demonstrates how this test accounts for new commerce
power jurisprudence by invalidating the hypothetical acts that present a majority of
the Morrison and Lopez concerns.
First, the "National Parks Clean Air Act," which regulates the emissions of
SO 2 and NOx and poses a single Morrison and Lopez concern, is a valid regulation

under the "direct physical harm" test. While each individual emission of NOx or
SO 2 may not lead to acid rain in a level necessary to noticeably harm the federal
lands, the general activity of emitting these compounds is a direct threat to public
lands because it is the specific elements from those emissions that form the acidic
compounds that come down 1in acid rain, and as Appel suggests, "harm federal
lands in a demonstrable way. 14
Also valid under the "direct physical harm" test is Appel's "Clean Water Act."
Using reasoning similar to Appel's in creating his "nexus" test," l5 Congress could,
as it did in Kleppe with burros and wild horses, identify migratory birds that touch
federal lands as "'an integral part of the natural system of the public lands' of the
United States, ' 16 or, simply, as part of the public lands. Since .filling wetlands
causes "direct physical harm" to these birds, regulating such activity would protect
a part of the public lands from harm.
Appel's version of the "Endangered Species Act"" 7 is also valid under the
"direct physical harm" test, but Akins's version is not. Under Appel's version of
the Act, Congress could identify endangered species as "an integral part of the
natural system" of the public lands as long as those species touch federal property.
The regulation of the extraterritorial takings of these animals would be, therefore, a
regulation of activity that poses a direct threat of "physical harm" to the public
lands. Akins's version of the same Act, 1 8 which arouses a majority of the
Morrison and Lopez concerns, would not be valid under the "physical harm" test
because it calls for protection of species found nowhere on federal lands. These
species could not be considered part of the public lands, and therefore, protecting
them would not prevent a direct physical threat to those lands.
Like Akins's "Endangered Species Act," the "Gun-Free Federal Building
Zones Act" presents two of the three Morrison and Lopez concerns and, in the
same manner, is not valid under the "physical harm" test. The Act regulates the

113. See United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (In making the failure to
extinguish a fire built near public lands a crime, Congress clearly was protecting the federal
lands from the directphysical harm of forest fire.); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,
525-26 (1897) (Congress's prohibition on fences that enclose federal property is a protection
from direct physical harm, as species integralto the naturalsystems of the public lands, and
therefore part of the federal property, would be physically harmed by the fences, which
prohibit natural grazing and hunting patterns necessary for the survival of these species.).
114. Appel, supra note 6, at 84.
115. Appel suggests that Congress should identify the migratory birds as an "essential
attribute of the beauty and value of public lands," in order to create a "nexus" to those lands.
Id. at 123.
116. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535 (1976) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331
(Supp. IV 1970)).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
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carrying of firearms near federal buildings, which can "cause death and serious
injury, limit worker productivity, and create increased security costs."'1 9 Thus, the
Act regulates activity that directly threatens "physical harm" to the people and
employees on the public lands, but not the public lands themselves. While visitors
and employees, unlike the species in the Akins "Endangered Species Act," are on
the public lands, they can hardly be seen as integral to the "natural system of the
public lands."' 120 Therefore, employees on public lands cannot be determined by
Congress to be part of those lands, and the "Gun-Free Federal Building Zones Act"
fails the "direct physical harm" test.
Finally, the "National Parks Periphery Act," which presents police power and
interference with areas of traditional state regulation concerns, also fails to pass the
"direct physical harm" test. Unlike the Acts discussed before it, the "National Parks
Periphery Act" is not aimed at a threat of "physical harm"; at most, it could be said
to protect public lands from an aesthetic harm. Thus, the "National Parks Periphery
Act" also fails the "direct physical harm" test.
The "direct physical harm" test, therefore, shows its efficacy in dealing with
the Morrison and Lopez concerns by invalidating all the hypothetical acts that
present a majority of the concerns addressed in those cases.
CONCLUSION

Peter Appel's broad vision of the property power validates a number of
hypothetical extraterritorial environmental regulations. He concludes that acting
pursuant to the property power, Congress could regulate pollution, endangered
species, land-use, and wetlands both on and off the federal lands. For scholars
looking for alternative congressional authority for regulating the environment in the
face of limits on the commerce power, Appel's hypothetical acts serve as a beacon
of hope.
An examination of the property power, however, has revealed that it presents a
number of the same concerns that inspired the Court to limit the commerce power:
an unchecked federal police power; 121 the aggregation of effects that, on their face,
have nothing to do with the clause at hand; 2223 and interference by the federal
government in areas of traditional state concern.1

119. Appel, supra note 6, at 98.
120. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 535 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1970)) (emphasis
added).
121. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000) ("'[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 564)).
122. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. ("If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.").
123. Id. at 611 ("'Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern.., the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory."' (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
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With this in mind, it becomes clear that the Court will have great incentive to
place limitations on the property power as well. What that limitation will be is not
clear from property power jurisprudence. The "direct physical harm" test proposed
in this Note, however, is a prediction of the type of limitation the Court might
adopt. 24 The test accommodates new Commerce Clause jurisprudence by
separating hypothetical acts in this Note that present a majority of Morrison and
Lopez concerns from those that do not. Environmentalists should be relieved to see
that, even under this test, Congress would still have the opportunity to regulate
undesirable activities as long as the legislation is designed to protect the public
lands from "direct physical harm." They should not, however, expect the Court that
limited the commerce power in Morrison and Lopez to turn a blind eye to the
concerns of those cases when addressing the property power.

124. This Note does not try to answer the question of whether the Court ought to adopt
the "direct physical harm" test or an: test that limits Congress's Property Clause power.

